Speaking at a briefing two days days ago, Paula DeSutter, Assistant Secretary of State, mentioned that Georgia-related setbacks notwithstanding, State Department is hopeful that "things can evolve in a positive way so that we can move forward on a post-START agreement [with Russia]." That would be very difficult of course, but one can always hope.
The State Department did, as it turns out, take the post-START agreement seriously - the draft document prepared there is reportedly "hundred or so pages long". This stands in contrast with the Pentagon attitude - the DoD-prepared draft is said to be a very short "Moscow Treaty plus" document.
On August 29, 2008 the Rocket Forces conducted a successful launch of a Dnepr launcher from the silo No. 95 of the launch complex No. 109 of the Baykonur test site. The launch took place at 11:15:53 MSK (07:15:53 UTC). The launcher delivered into orbit five RapidEye satellites for the German Space Agency.
The missile used in the launch is a converted R-36MUTTH (RS-20B) ICBM. The Rocket Forces did not disclose the exact age of the missile, but it is at least 25 years old - missiles of these type were deployed in 1979-1983. The space launch was simultaneously a flight test that was used to confirm reliability of the missile.
On August 28, 2008 the Strategic Rocket Forces conducted a successful launch of a Topol (SS-25) missile. The launch took place at 14:36 MSK (10:36 UTC) from the Plesetsk test site. The Rocket Forces reported that the warhead successfully reached its intended target at the Kura test site in Kamchatka.
The missile that was tested had been in service for 21 years. Most likely it was deployed with the missile division in Novosibirsk - the crews of the Glukhov Guard Missile Division based in Novosibirsk were reported to be leaving for the test site earlier this week. The press-release mentioned an "experimental warhead" (which, of course, would be able to defeat all possible missile defenses). My guess would be that these might be some new decoys or penetration aids - these are normally deployed with all Russian missiles.
UPDATE 09/05/08: According to another report the launch was performed by the crews of the Yoshkar-Ola division.
Just as I noticed that we haven't heard anything about the Bulava tests for a while, we got a report from Sevmash that the Dmitri Donskoy submarine returned to the port after spending about a month at sea.
It appears that I guessed it about right last time - no Bulava launch was planned during this trip. As far as I can tell, the test launches would be resumed only in 2009. The exact purpose of the current sea trial is not quite clear - it looks like the boat underwent some significant modernization. I'm wondering if that was a launch tube modification.
One of the Topol (SS-25) missiles was put on public display at the Artillery Museum in St-Petersburg.
It's been a month since Rossiiskaya gazeta reported that Dmitry Donskoy submarine was preparing to go to sea to conduct tests of the Bulava missile. No news about the test yet. This, of course, could mean many different things. It's possible that a flight test was canceled. If it was planned, that is --it's also possible that the tests that Dmitry Donskoy was to conduct did not include a missile launch. I think we would have heard something if there was a launch failure.
If there's a consensus about the confrontation between Russia and Georgia, it's that the conflict has seriously strained the relationship between Moscow and its Western counterparts--namely, the United States and NATO. Now that the worst of the conflict seems over, it appears that the harshest measures suggested in the first days of the conflict, i.e., expelling Russia from the G-8, won't materialize. Despite all of the disagreements and mistrust, each party seems to understand that severing ties between Russia and the West isn't realistic.
The problem is that while G-8 membership is highly visible and symbolic, it isn't the most important element of the partnership between Russia and the West. This partnership is only as strong as the network of concrete agreements and bureaucratic arrangements that allow governments to work closely together, creating what someone aptly named "habits of cooperation." Today's sorry U.S.-Russian relationship is a direct result of Washington and Moscow neglecting in recent years the few existing cooperative arrangements between the countries.
The danger is that in the emotional atmosphere of the aftermath of the Georgia conflict, the United States and Russia could damage the foundation of their relationship further, strengthening elements in both countries that are either indifferent or hostile to the idea of a partnership. Already, the early signs seem to indicate that we're moving in that direction.
Military cooperation between NATO and Russia may be the conflict's first political victim. For instance, Moscow has decided to halt joint military-to-military projects with NATO--a move that would cancel about 10 joint exercises scheduled for this year. And while both NATO and Moscow are leaving some room for normalization, the mood in the Kremlin seems to be that Russia has nothing to lose if it severs all ties with NATO.
The U.S.-Russian agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation is another likely casualty of the conflict. Although the agreement probably wouldn't have entered into force during the Bush administration--the administration got the timing wrong--now it's probable that Congress will pass a resolution explicitly rejecting it, making it difficult for the next administration to bring the agreement back--even if that administration decides that the agreement is an important means in which to cooperate and secure a powerful Russian ally, Rosatom, the Russian nuclear agency. I should note that Rosatom representatives are upset that the conflict in Georgia could potentially prevent the agreement from becoming a reality.
It's also unlikely that any of the proposals for transparency or cooperation regarding European missile defense will get a chance--especially given that the Georgia conflict quickly led to Washington and Warsaw finalizing a deal that would feature Poland hosting missile defense interceptors. Russian generals responded by threatening to add Poland to Moscow's nuclear target lists--a particularly ominous threat.
At this point, no one knows the full extent of the fallout from the Georgia conflict. Some pessimists have gone so far as to ask if Russia will pull out of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and other efforts to reduce the danger of nuclear weapons or curtail access to the International Space Station. Personally, I don't envision this happening--precisely because these are established programs that have substantial internal support in Russia.
Of course, setbacks are inevitable--it's difficult to make a case for continuing a partnership in the midst of a crisis. But we should try to remember that cooperation isn't a reward for good behavior or a bargaining chip. Rather, "the habits of cooperation" are important building blocks of a stable, trusting, and equitable relationship that would make conflicts such as the one in Georgia impossible.
After the launch of an SLBM from the Ryazan submarine on August 1, 2008 the Navy for some reason did not announce the type of the missile. Even though it was unlikely that the missile was anything but R-29R, the reason for this secrecy was unclear. Now the Makeyev Design Bureau confirmed that it was an RSM-50/R-29R missile. However, as it was suspected, it was a somewhat unusual missile - according to the report, it carried a "modified instrumentation section". It's not quite clear at this point what that means but I hope we'll find out.
UPDATE 08/05/08: I checked the post on the previous R-29RM launch - at the time the Navy said that the test had something to do with "reliability of the command and control system". Which makes me wonder if this is what the "modified instrumentation section" was all about.
One of the Project 667BDR submarines, Ryazan, which returned to service last year after an overhaul, conducted a successful launch of a ballistic missile. The missile was launched from a submerged submarine deployed in the Barents Sea. The warhead was reported to reach the Kura test site successfully. Although the Russian Navy was unusually secretive about the type of the missile, it almost certainly was the R-29R. The Navy representative told Interfax that it was a missile that had already been in service and that it was neither Bulava or Sineva.
This is, of course, an old missile, but the Soviet Union produced them in large quantities at the time, so it looks like there are enough of them to arm one or two submarines. There was a report that suggested that Russia resumed large-scale production of SLBMs, but it appears that was a misquote and as far as R-29R missiles are concerned Russia is relying on the old Soviet stock.
UPDATE 08/04/08: According to Roskosmos, the launch took place at 12:52 MSK (08:52 UTC). It is possible that it was not a usual R-29R missile - the launch involved Makeyev Design Bureau representatives.
As the Topol/SS-25 missiles are reaching end of their service lives and being removed from service, some missile divisions are being disbanded. So far, Kansk, Drovyanaya, and Yuriya (these are START names) have been liquidated. But some divisions will stay - mobile SS-27 missiles are being deployed in Teykovo and apparently the 59th Guard Missile Division in Irkutsk/Zelenyy will stay as well. According to General Linnik, the chief of armaments of the Rocket Forces, the division will soon receive new missiles, which would remain in service for the next 25-30 years.
The book
